Refereed Publications

Rooney, Bryan. “Emergency Powers in Democracies and International Conflict.” Forthcoming, Journal of Conflict Resolution

Alexander, Dan and Bryan Rooney. Vote Buying by the United States in the United Nations.” Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly

Rooney, Bryan. “Sources of Leader Support and Interstate Rivalry.” International Interactions. 2018. 44(5): 969-983.

DiLorenzo, Matthew and Bryan Rooney. “Domestic Uncertainty, Third-Party Resolve, and International Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research. 2018. 55(4): 445-459.

Works in Progress

Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States

Recent terrorist violence has led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Scholars have not yet examined whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take repressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the nature of the terrorist group. Using data on emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between states of emergency, emergency power strength, and the probability of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from separatist groups, they have no effect on forms of terror that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.

See here for the latest version of this paper.

Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Political Change (with Matthew DiLorenzo)

A central hypothesis in the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is that multinational firms condition their investment choices on domestic political dynamics and instability in host countries. Existing research on this question focuses mainly on relatively static measures of domestic political context such as the presence or absence of certain political or legal institutions that may enhance the security of firms’ investments. Yet no existing study systematically examines the relationship between domestic political events and investment behavior. Recent literature identifies turnover in domestic governing coalitions as an important source of political uncertainty. We argue that domestic turnover in potential host countries should be associated with decreased FDI. Because domestic changes create uncertainty about the future direction of policy in a variety of areas relevant to investment decisions — e.g., changes in privileged relationships between the state and certain domestic producers or industries, trade barriers, tax policies — firms should exercise greater caution following domestic turnover in potential host countries. However, various institutional features of democracies — transparency, policy consistency across ruling coalitions, and peaceful transitions of power — should mitigate the extent to which domestic turnover causes uncertainty and deters investment. For this reason, we expect domestic turnover in democratic host countries to be unrelated to FDI flows. Using data on changes in governing coalitions from the Change in Source of Leader Support dataset (Mattes, Leeds and Matsumura 2016), we find support for these expectations. While non-democracies see less investment in the wake of a change in the source of leader support, FDI flows to democracies do not change significantly following domestic turnover. Our analysis enhances our understanding of the determinants of FDI and provides further evidence that the distinction between democratic and non-democratic institutions matters for foreign and domestic policy in a new empirical domain.

Please contact me or Matthew DiLorenzo for the latest version of this paper.

Arms Transfers, Alliances, and International Conflict (with Matthew DiLorenzo)

In this article, we build on existing research by further elaborating the conditions under which arms transfers may affect the likelihood of international conflict. We argue that arms transfers send an unclear signal about the ally’s intentions since they may be seen as a substitute for intervention. However, when arms are transferred from a third-party that shares an alliance commitment with both states engaged in crisis bargaining, this helps to clarify the likelihood of intervention because of the level of information shared between all parties. We test this theory using data on alliances, arms transfers, and rivalries. We find that while arms transfers from allies of only one of the rivals increases the probability of a military dispute, when an ally of both rivals sends arms to one side it does not increase the likelihood of conflict and decreases the likelihood of high-hostility conflict.

Please contact me or Matthew DiLorenzo for the latest version of this paper.

The Origins of Emergency Powers in Democratic States

This article discusses the origins of emergency powers in democratic states. Using data on emergency powers that codifies formal rules of institutional change during periods of emergency for all democracies from 1800 to 2012, the article examines the determinants of emergency power strength in democratic nations cross nationally. I find that previous and current conflict experience influence emergency power provision and strength, but also that domestic determinants have an impact on the types of instruments states institutionalize for times of emergency.

Please contact me for the latest version of this paper.